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PARAPHERNALIA FOR MARIJUANA AND HASHISH
USE: POSSESSION STATUTES AND
INDIANA'S PIPE DREAM
INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented growth of illicit drug use in this country
has prompted legislators to revamp statutory methods of drug
control. As a result of the renewed interest in this area, a ma-
jority of states have adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act since 1970.' Patterned after the Federal Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,2 the Uniform Act
provides a comprehensive and flexible system for coordinating
state and federal drug control. 3 This Act updates methods of
regulating legitimate drug handlers, thereby providing nationwide
control over drugs which might be diverted into illicit traffic."
In addition, the Act prohibits unauthorized manufacture, sale and
possession of controlled substances.' In adopting the Uniform
Act, however, each state prescribes the applicable criminal pen-
alties and alters its provisions to suit particular enforcement needs.
Some states have strengthened enforcement of the Uniform
Act's provisions by criminalizing activity surrounding drug use.
Such ancillary' drug legislation includes unique procedures for
narcotics enforcement, such as forfeiture of vehicles being used in
illicit drug traffic." Legislators have also created new criminal
offenses, including possession of hypodermic needles for illegal
drug injections,' maintaining a narcotics nuisance where drugs
1. By 1975, the Uniform Controlled Substances Act had been adopted
in at least 43 jurisdictions. Table of Adopting Jurisdictions, 9 U.L.A. 24
(Supp. 1975).
2. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1972).
3. Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 146-47 (1973).
4. UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT §§ 301-08.
5. Id. at §§ 401-08.
6. The legislation is "ancillary" in the sense that its primary thrust is
to support the basic legislation against drug possession and sale. The term
"ancillary" is employed and discussed in Corcoran, Compilation & Analysis of
Criminal Drug Laws in the 50 States and Five Territories, in DRUG USE IN
AMERICA: 2D REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND
DRUG ABUSE, III Appendix-Technical Papers 424 (1973).
7. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (1972); IND. CODE § 35-24-4-1 (1975) ;
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (Supp. 1973).
8. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 22-50 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-77.5 (1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.109:1 (1974).
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are stored or consumed," and being a narcotics vagrant, ie., a
drug user who wanders about at night without having a "good"
explanation for his activity.
Many of these ancillary statutes, however, have not survived
constitutional challenge. For instance, some vehicle forfeiture
laws have been found lacking in procedural due process." Hypo*
dermic statutes have been deemed an unreasonable interference
with property;"2 narcotics nuisance and vagrancy statutes have
been overturned for vagueness.'3
This note examines two types of ancillary statutes relating to
drug paraphernalia:" the first banning possession of objects used
to smoke drugs such as marijuana and hashish, the second pro-
hibiting manufacture or sale of this type of drug paraphernalia.
Initially, laws which prohibit pipe possession will be exam-
ined, their purposes and their constitutional defects considered.
Currently, five states make it a criminal offense to possess a pipe
or a similar object when the possessor intends to use it to smoke
a controlled drug.'5 These criminal statutes can best be under-
stood by reviewing the ineffectiveness of earlier paraphernalia
statutes against possessors of non-hypodermic paraphernalia. In
this light, it can be shown that problems arose under the older
statutes because of the very nature of the objects used forjsmok-
ing illegal drugs. The nature of this type of drug paraphernalia
9. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11557 (West 1975); IND.
CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-15 (1975).
10. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-416a (1967), held unconstitutional in Ricks v.
United States, 414 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
11. Michigan's statute was held unconstitutional because it did not re-
quire notice to the owner or an opportunity for a hearing. People v. Campbell,
39 Mich. App. 433, 198 N.W.2d 7 (1972). But see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
12. The Louisiana statute was held to create an invalid presumption
of criminal intent. State v. Birdsell, 235 La. 396, 104 So. 2d 148 (1958), con-
struing La. Acts 1951, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 30, § 1.
13. Ricks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (District of
Columbia vagrancy statute); English v. Miller, 341 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Va.
1972) (Virginia narcotic nuisance statute).
14. "Paraphernalia" in this context may be defined as "things used in
some activity; equipment; apparatus; trappings; gear." WEBsTER's NEw
WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1061 (College Ed. 1966).
15. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 258 (59) (a) (Supp. 1973); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §11364 (West 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §893.13(3)(a)(4)
(Supp. 1975); IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-8 (1975); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-
105 and 139 (1973).
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continues to create problems under the newer, more specific pipe
statutes. After the purpose behind existing pipe possession stat-
utes in these five states is identified, the laws will be scrutinized
in light of due process standards for statutory definiteness. This
note proposes that the present pipe possession statutes are uncon-
stitutionally vague in that they fail to provide either notice to pipe
possessors or adjudicative guidelines for law enforcers. Failure
to provide adjudicative guidelines is particularly objectionable be-
cause of the crucial role which pipe possession laws play in justi-
fying unreasonable searches of suspected drug users.
Secondly, the discussion focuses on the purposes and consti-
tutional infirmities of Section 9 of Indiana's Controlled Substances
Act,' 6 which prohibits manufacture or sale of paraphernalia for
marijuana, hashish or cocaine use. Although Section 9 was in-
tended to prevent the growth of drug abuse, it is, in comparison
with other paraphernalia sale statutes, a totally ineffective and
unreasonable means to prevent the use of controlled substances.
As such, the statute is an arbitrary and irrational exercise of the
police power to control drugs, violating the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. In addition, Section 9 invites selec-
tive, discriminatory enforcement because it fails to provide ade-
quate notice or adjudicative guidelines, violating due process defi-
niteness standards.
PARAPHERNALIA POSSESSION STATUTES
Five states have laws which prohibit possession of pipes and
other paraphernalia for non-heroin drug use.'7 This section exam-
ines these recently enacted possession statutes, their language,
purpose and impact in justifying drug searches. In order to un-
derstand these pipe laws, it is helpful to consider why other drug
paraphernalia laws proved ineffective against possessors of para-
phernalia for marijuana and hashish use.
Ineffectiveness of Prior Statutes
Statutes specifically prohibiting possession of paraphernalia
for marijuana or hashish use are an extension of earlier laws
which proscribe possession of hypodermic instruments. Many
states have statutes outlawing possession of needles and syringes
which are intended for illegal drug injection.'8 Yet the very lan-
16. IND. CODE §§ 35-24.1-1-1 to 35-24.1-6-ic (1975).
17. See note 15 supra.
18. See note 8 supra.
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guage of most of these provisions renders them ineffective against
possessors of non-hypodermic drug paraphernalia. For example,
in Kraft v. State,'9 the Maryland hypodermic statute was held
not to proscribe possession of a marijuana pipe. In Kraft, an
expert narcotics officer testified that the pipe, made from metal
fittings and containing marijuana residue, was a type frequently
used to smoke marijuana and seldom used for tobacco. Notwith-
standing this evidence, the court rejected the state's claim that
the pipe was contraband. Noting that the statute prohibited only
instruments used for administering drugs "by hypodermic injec-
tions,"2 the court concluded that the law's clear language pre-
cluded prosecution for the possession of marijuana paraphernalia.
Where it is less clear from the statutory language whether
pipes or other non-hypodermic implements are proscribed, prose-
cutors have had only mixed success when using the statutes against
possessors of marijuana paraphernalia. In New York, a series
of prosecutions for possession of non-hypodermic instruments re-
sulted in serious disagreement among courts about the legislature's
intent to include pipes in the statute. The ambiguous statute pro-
hibited possession of a hypodermic needle or syringe, "or any in-
strument or implement adapted for the administration of nar-
cotic drugs."'" While one court categorically excluded pipes from
the purview of the statute, others strained to include pipes used
for marijuana smoking.
The narrowest view of the New York statute was taken in
People v. Berger." The prosecution in Berger contended that the
presence of marijuana residue in an ordinary briar pipe made it
an "adapted instrument" within the scope of the statute. Reject-
ing this argument, the Albany County Court emphasized that even
marijuana residue does not transform the basic nature of such
pipes which are used by countless persons for tobacco smoking. 3
Considering the "any instrument" clause, the Berger court de-
clared:
It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended to pro-
scribe the use of or possession of ordinary tobacco pipes
19. 18 Md. App. 169, 305 A.2d 489 (1973), con8truing MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 287 (Supp. 1973).
20. Id. at 171, 305 A.2d at 491.
21. Laws of New York, 1952, ch. 91, § 1, a8 amended N.Y. PuBLic
HEALTH LAW § 3381 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
22. 61 Misc. 2d 475, 305 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Albany County Ct. 1969).
23. Id. at 476, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1976], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss2/6
PARAPHERNALIA STATUTES
except with a prescription by a physician. To extend the
[statute] to the point of making ordinary tobacco pipes
illegal goes beyond reasonable interpretation of the law.2 '
Thus, ordinary pipes, even with marijuana residue, were held not
to be "instruments or implements adapted" for drug use.
While other New York courts rejected the restrictive reason-
ing of Berger, they were unable to set a standard for determining
when a pipe was "adapted" for drug use. In People v. Queen,25
the Duchess County Court held that the water pipes in question
were prohibited by the statute because they had been "adapted"
for drug use. The Queen court reasoned that the legislature did
not intend to prohibit water pipes per se, since they are frequently
used only for ornamentation. However, once such a pipe had been
"adapted" for narcotics purposes, the pipe, normally a harmless
instrument, was converted into a "dangerous object."2 The court
held that to adopt the narrow view announced in Berger, restrict-
ing the statute to hypodermic instruments, would frustrate the
legislative attempt to alleviate the problems of drug use.2" How-
ever, while holding that an "adapted" water pipe was within the
scope of the statute, the Queen court provided no rules or guide-
lines for determining what would constitute illegal adaptation of
an otherwise innocuous pipe.
A second New York decision rejecting the narrow view of
Berger also failed to set a standard for determining what would
make a pipe illegal paraphernalia. In People v. Landon, 8 the Cort-
land County Court upheld a conviction for possession of an ordi-
nary tobacco pipe which contained a wire filter with marijuana
residue. The court, unable to state as a matter of law that a wire
filter alone would make an ordinary pipe illegal, left that deter-
mination for the trier of fact. 29 Hence, both the Queen and
Landon courts made specific determinations regarding the ap-
plication of the statute without enunciating any criteria to be
used in deciding what instruments were within the purview of
the statute.
A careful examination of the language of the New York
statute suggests that the Berger reasoning, excluding non-hypo-
24. Id.
25. 66 Misc. 2d 616, 322 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Duchess County Ct. 1971).
26. Id. at 618, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
27. Id.
28. 68 Misc. 2d 809, 327 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Cortland County Ct. 1971).
29. Id. at 810-11, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 972-73.
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dermic paraphernalia, was closer to the intent of the legislature.
The statute first mentioned specific items-hypodermic needles
and syringes-before continuing to more general language-"other
instrument or implement." If one applies the ejusdem generis rule
of statutory construction,"° it is clear that the New York statute
was limited to paraphernalia accompanying the use of drugs by
hypodermic injection." In fact, a subsequent amendment of the
statute limited the scope to hypodermic needles and syringes, in-
dicating that the legislature intended to correct the ambiguity.2
Although the New York amendment clearly determined that
pipes are not contraband in that state, courts in other jurisdic-
tions questioned whether pipes could be deemed illegal narcotics
paraphernalia. For example, the District of Columbia, which does
not have a specific drug paraphernalia statute, has a unique alter-
native technique for prohibiting possession of hypodermic instru-
ments. The District of Columbia's general "implements of crime"
statute prohibits possession of any "instrument, tool, or other im-
plement . . . that is usually employed . . . in the commission of
any crime."" Although the statute itself is silent as to criminal
intent, courts have construed it to require proof that the possessor
intended to use the implement in a crime. There are two ways
to establish the requisite criminal intent. Intent may be inferred
either from circumstances surrounding the possession, or from
possession of implements which themselves give rise to "sinister
implications" of criminal purpose.3 4 Courts in the District of Co-
lumbia have consistently recognized that non-prescription posses-
sion of hypodermic needles or syringes gives rise to "sinister im-
plications" that the possessor intended to use them in the crime
of illegal drug injection."
30. According to the rule, "where general words follow an enumeration
of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words . . .are to be held as applying only to persons or things of
the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 608 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
31. In People v. Gordon, 71 Misc. 2d 540, 336 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Batavia
County Ct. 1972), the court held that the statute was restricted to hypodermic
instruments. The decision rested on the ejusdem generis rule and the subse-
quent amendment.
32. N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW §3381 (McKinney Supp. 1976), as
amended Laws of New York, 1972, ch. 878, § 2, amending Laws of New York,
1952, ch. 91, § 1.
33. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3601 (1967).
34. Benton v. United States, 232 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
35. See, e.g., Rosser v. United States, 313 A.2d 876 (D.C. Ct. App.
1974); Jones v. United States, 282 A.2d 561 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
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Applying the general implements statute to non-hypodermic
paraphernalia, however, presents certain problems. In Williams V.
United States,16 the District of Columbia Municipal Court of Ap-
peals held that a small wooden pipe containing marijuana residue
did not raise the "sinister implications" necessary to make it an
implement of crime. The court suggested, however, that further
evidence as to the shape or size of the pipe or the significance of
the residue could present "sinister implications" and justify a
decision that a pipe was an implement of crime.3 ' In addition,
the decision left open the possibility that mere possession of a
pipe could be illegal, if the circumstances surrounding possession
implied a criminal intent to use it for smoking illegal drugs.
Thus, attempts to use various drug paraphernalia statutes
against non-hypodermic paraphernalia have been frustrated, pri-
marily because of the nature of the objects themselves. Para-
phernalia for marijuana and hashish use are subject to numerous
beneficial uses; they cannot be restricted, like hypodermic in-
struments, to those with medical prescriptions. Moreover, pipes
used to smoke drugs are not inherently sinister; they cannot be
distinguished from ordinary tobacco pipes. Other states have en-
acted statutes specifically designed to include non-hypodermic
paraphernalia. However, these statutes face similar problems
raised by the nature of the objects they are intended to proscribe.
Existing Pipe Possession Statutes
Presently, five states have laws which are clearly intended
to reach non-hypodermic paraphernalia. 8 While these more spe-
cific statutes avoid the questions of legislative intent which
plagued the general implements of crime and hypodermic stat-
utes,"' their constitutional validity is questionable. Attempts to
classify such diverse objects as might be used for marijuana and
hashish consumption have resulted in statutes which violate due
process standards of definiteness. This vagueness is particularly
36. 304 A.2d 287 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973).
37. Id. at 289.
38. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 258(59) (a) (Supp. 1973); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11364 (West 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §893.13(3)(a)(4)
(Supp. 1975); IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-8 (1975); Miss. CODs ANN. §§ 41-29-
105 and 139 (1973).
In State v. Harper, 510 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. App. 1974), the court held that
the Missouri paraphernalia statute, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 195.020 (1972), was
broad enough to encompass "hash pipes." However, the statute was held
nugatory because no penalty was provided.
39. See notes 21-37 supra and accompanying text.
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intolerable, considering the role these statutes play in justifying
drug searches which violate the fourth amendment.
The language of all five pipe possession statutes is strikingly
similar. The California statute is representative:
It is unlawful to possess an opium pipe or any device,
contrivance, instrument or paraphernalia used for unlaw-
fully injecting or smoking ... a controlled substance."*
Alabama's statute is identical,"1 while Indiana's, 2 Mississippi's43
and Florida's ' require proof of intent to violate other narcotics
laws. In each state, the paraphernalia offense is a misdemeanor,
generally carrying the same penalty as the first offense for posses-
sion of the drug itself. "5
There are several reasons which may have prompted the
legislatures of these five states to draft pipe possession laws.
First, the paraphernalia statutes bolster efforts to enforce drug
possession laws by expanding police opportunities to arrest and
search drug users.4 ' If a pipe used to smoke marijuana is itself
contraband, police may arrest drug users for the paraphernalia
offense even though the drug has been destroyed or consumed.
The statute also permits arrests in group situations where only
one person may have actual possession of the drug;7 others in
the group may be arrested for possessing the objects used to smoke
the drug. Pipe possession laws may also be intended to serve a
preventative function. Indiana legislators, in enacting a pipe stat-
ute, were motivated by the belief that distinctive paraphernalia
designed for marijuana and hashish smoking "tends to lure more
40. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11364 (West 1975). A 1975 amend-
ment to California's narcotics laws lowered penalties for marijuana posses-
sion and eliminated application of the paraphernalia statute to marijuana.
Paraphernalia for hashish and cocaine use are still included in the statute.
Act of July 9, 1975, Sen. Bill No. 95.
41. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 258(59) (a) (Supp. 1973).
42. IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-8 (1975).
43. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-105 and 139 (1973).
44. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(3) (a) (4) (Supp. 1975).
45. For example, in Indiana, first offenses for both marijuana posses-
sion, IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-11(b) (1975), and pipe possession, IND. CODE
§ 35-24.1-4.1-8(b) (1975), are misdemeanors, with maximum penalties of one
year imprisonment and a five hundred dollar fine.
46. For a brief discussion of the use of various ancillary drug statutes
in law enforcement, see Corcoran, supra note 6, at 245.
47. Possession of drugs, in the legal meaning, requires more than mere
proximity to the drug or presence on the property where the drug is found.
See Murray v. United States, 403 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968).
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young people into using these drugs." '48 The legislators hoped to
prevent drug use by removing what they felt was a "significant
stimulus to use illegal drugs."4 9
In drafting pipe laws to implement these purposes effec-
tively, legislatures face problems in including the wide range of
objects which can be employed in non-hypodermic drug use. Mari-
juana, for instance, can be smoked in elaborate water pipes, or
pipes which electrically cool the smoke, as well as in ordinary
cigarette papers and common tobacco pipes. Hashish smokers
may prefer small metal pipes, "bongs" or "chillams,"'5 yet an
ordinary corncob pipe is adequate for their purposes. Attempt-
ing to include such diverse objects in the statutes, legislators
have not listed specific items, but have instead resorted to such
nebulous terms as "articles," "devices," or "implements."'" This
broad language, together with the wide range and the normally
innocent uses of most of the objects, suggests that the statutes
are inherently vague. In order to determine whether the pipe
possession statutes are so vague as to violate constitutional stan-
dards for definiteness, it is helpful first to review due process
requirements for statutory definiteness.
Due Process Definiteness
The constitutional doctrine that statutes must be definite is
grounded in the theory that an enactment may be so vague and
indefinite that it would be a denial of due process to penalize a
person for violating it. To determine whether a statute is so
vague as to violate due process, two basic tests are applied.2 One
requires that persons be given notice of what conduct is pro-
hibited; the second is that the statute be sufficiently definite to
provide guidelines for enforcement and adjudication.
48. Letter from Charles E. Bosma to M. Gienapp, Oct. 1975, on file
Valparaiso University Law School Library.
49. Letter from Leslie Duvall to M. Gienapp, Sept. 18, 1975, on file
Valparaiso University Law School Library.
50. Bongs and chillams (or "chillums") are types of pipes which often
contain water for cooling the smoke. See HIGH TIMES magazine, published
bimonthly by Trans-High Corp., New York, for advertising, articles and
drawings of drug paraphernalia.
51. All five statutes use similar terms. See note 38 8upra.
52. For complete analyses of due process definiteness, see Note, Due
Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1948),
and Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 67 (1960).
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The traditional standard for measuring the definiteness of
a criminal statute has been the notice requirement." This notice
requirement is premised on the assumption "that man is free to
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct. 5  For this freedom
to be meaningful, the terms of a penal statute "must be suffi-
ciently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what con-
duct on their part will render them liable to its penalties."55
Vague and indefinite language provides no warning and may
thus trap those who act innocently. 6
A statute may be relieved of its objectionability for failing
to provide notice if it punishes only "willful" conduct."' As the
Supreme Court emphasized in Screws v. United States,8 "will-
fulness" in this context means more than criminal intent; it de-
notes a bad purpose or an evil motive to accomplish that which
the statute condemns." Because such a law cannot become a trap
for those who act in good faith, the notice function of due process
definiteness becomes less important. "A mind intent upon willful
[conduct] is inconsistent with surprised innocence."60 As long as
the statute, in punishing willful conduct, satisfies the second re-
quirement of definiteness by providing adjudicative standards, it
will be upheld.
The second test of due process definiteness, requiring guide-
lines for enforcement and adjudication, has been emphasized in
recent cases involving indefinite criminal statutes. Personal, non-
commercial conduct is not normally plotted out in advance; indi-
viduals do not generally consult criminal statutes before pursuing
criminal conduct. Therefore, the notice test of definiteness is less
53. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 385 (1926).
54. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
55. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
56. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
57. This facet of the notice requirement of definiteness was fully ex-
plored in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). The defendants were
charged under a statute which punished those who, under color of law, will-
fully deprived a person of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution." See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 20, 35
Stat. 1091. They challenged the statute for vagueness, alleging that it pro-
vided no notice of what acts were prohibited. The Supreme Court upheld the
statute since it punished only willful conduct, and therefore the accused could
not be said to suffer from lack of notice. Accord, United States v. Ragen,
314 U.S. 513 (1942).
58. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
59. Id. at 101.
60. United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942).
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crucial and it is more meaningful to consider whether a criminal
statute provides guidelines and limitations for those who apply
the law."
The objective of the adjudicative test is to prevent selective
enforcement and arbitrary convictions by setting out guidelines
and limitations for those who apply the law. 62 Accordingly, stat-
utes must provide some ascertainable standard for determining
what conduct is criminal. The constitutional infirmity of a vague
statute is that it "allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to
pursue their personal predilections. 63 Indefinite language,
creates an unclear, variable standard of guilt for the
fact-finder, or permits an unduly broad discretion in the
administrator, [and] the possibilities of an even-handed
application of law and of effective judicial review are
substantially decreased."
Because selective enforcement, arbitrary and inconsistent convic-
tions are wholly at odds with fundamental notions of due process,
indefinite statutes which invite such results are held void-for-
vagueness. "
Applying this analysis of due process definiteness to exist-
ing pipe possession statutes, it is clear that they are unconstitu-
tionally vague. Although the same conclusion must be reached as
to all five laws, the language of the Indiana statute may be used
to illustrate the constitutional defects in pipe possession laws.
The statute reads:
A person is guilty of unlawful possession of parapherna-
lia if with intent to violate any provision of [the Con-
trolled Substances Act] he possesses any instrument or
contrivance designed for smoking ...a controlled sub-
stance.66
The law requires proof that the person intend to sell or possess
a controlled drug, and that he possess an object "designed for"
61. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).
62. Cases emphasizing the threat of discriminatory enforcement posed
by vague statutes include Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611 (1971).
63. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974).
64. Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectatiozs, 1963 SuP. CT. REV.
101, 110.
65. See note 62 supra.
66. IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-8 (1975).
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smoking a controlled drug, including marijuana and hashish. Since
the law applies only to persons who have a particular intent, the
reasonableness of notice must be measured subjectively from that
person's viewpoint. He is warned only that he may not possess
an "instrument . . . designed for smoking" an illegal drug. He is
given no standards to determine whether any object in his posses-
sion is, in fact, "designed for" that purpose." May he not possess
a corncob pipe, an electrical clamp, a water pipe used for orna-
mentation? The language of the statute is so indefinite that it
gives no warning of what objects must be avoided. Because it
forbids conduct "in terms so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning, [it] violates the first
essential of due process."6
It may be argued that the absence of notice is rectified be-
cause the pipe statute requires a criminal intent. However, the
inclusion of an intent requirement does not bring the statute
within the Screws exception for statutes requiring willfulness.""
Because the defendants in Screws had an evil motive in violating
the law, they did not act in good faith and could not claim sur-
prise at discovering their conduct was unlawful. While those who
intend to violate narcotics laws cannot claim innocence, they need
not act with an evil motive to violate the pipe possession statute.
The statute punishes possession of an object, a pipe, coupled with
an intent to violate another law, possession of illicit drugs. It does
not punish willful possession of a pipe. Even a good faith effort
to avoid possessing objects "designed for" drug use may prove
futile. The Indiana pipe statute is so vague that it may trap
those who act innocently because it does not provide fair warn-
ing of the forbidden conduct.
The statute is also defective under the second, adjudicative,
test of definiteness. By considering the pipe statute from the
viewpoint of those who must enforce the law, it is clear that no
67. The next section of the Indiana statute, IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-9
(1975), prohibiting sale of paraphernalia, lists a number of objects which
are "designed for or intended for use in" smoking drugs. Although the list
is to be used only for the sale section, there is a danger that the same list
could be used to supply the design and intent elements of the possession sec-
tion. The danger exists because both statutes apply to the same type of ob-
jects. If the list is employed in possession cases, the possessor of any of the
enumerated items would be forced to overcome the legislative presumption of
intent to prove his innocence. See notes 127 and 151 infra and accompany-
ing text.
68. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
69. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
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ascertainable standards are enunciated for determining when the
statute is violated. How is a police officer to know that a par-
ticular pipe is "designed for" smoking marijuana and not for
smoking tobacco? On what basis could a jury say that the offi-
cer's judgment was correct or incorrect? The statute simply pro-
vides no guidelines for enforcement or adjudication, but allows
arrests and convictions of an ad hoc, subjective basis. Such a law
invites selective and discriminatory enforcement and permits ar-
bitrary convictions-the precise results due process definiteness
serves to prevent.
None of the factors which can impart meaning to vague lan-
guage are present here to redeem the statute. Where common
law terms are used in a statute, they carry with them a long his-
tory of interpretation and specialized meanings."' Indiana's pipe
possession law, however, contains no common law terms. If there
is prior judicial interpretation limiting the scope of an otherwise
vague statute, that interpretation is treated as though written into
the law." Although Indiana has had a similar possession statute
since 1971,2 there are no reported cases interpreting or apply-
ing it. Thus, there is no judicial gloss on the language of the
statute which would supply notice or guide future adjudication.
Common experience may also indicate that terms are understand-
able and contain adjudicative standards."3 However, it is beyond
the common experience of a jury to know what constitutes drug
paraphernalia. Recognizing this, California courts have required
expert testimony to establish that a particular pipe is in fact used
for illegal drug consumption." Neither the California nor the
Indiana statute provides any guidelines for the jury to assess the
expert testimony, nor is there any standard by which a defense
attorney could challenge it.
Practical factors must be taken into account in determining
the degree of definiteness required of a particular statute. Courts
will consider whether, given the nature of the subject matter, it
70. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Nash v.
United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913); Morgan v. City of Detroit, 389 F.
Supp. 922, 929 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
71. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948). See generally Rose
v. Locke, 96 S. Ct. 243 (1975) (per curiam).
72. IND. CODE § 16-6-8-3(g) (1973).
73. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 393 (1932) ("shortest practicable
route" held sufficient by common experience); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32,
40 (1924) ("undesirable residents" meaningful by common usage).
74. Fraher v. Superior Court for County of Los Angeles, 77 Cal. Rptr.
366, 370, 272 Cal. App. 2d 155, 159 (1969).
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is possible to make the law more precise."' If the subject matter
of a statute eludes precision, the statute must still provide "rea-
sonable" or "adequate" notice. 6 A necessarily indefinite statute
which arguably lacks enforcement guidelines will be deemed suf-
ficiently definite if it is necessary to vest broad discretion in law
enforcement officials. Thus, in Colton v. Kentucky,"7 the Supreme
Court upheld a disorderly conduct statute against a vagueness
challenge. Because of the wide range of conduct which could be
considered disorderly, exact precision was impossible. The Colton
Court held that the law gave reasonable notice,"' and emphasized
that police must be permitted to make on-the-spot decisions when
they attempt to maintain public order."" A tightly worded statute
would not be desirable because of the threat to public order posed
by disorderly conduct.
It may be argued that Indiana's pipe possession statute is
necessarily indefinite. Because of the wide range of objects which
are used to smoke controlled drugs, greater precision may not be
possible. However, the statute does not provide reasonable warn-
ing of what is forbidden; it gives no warning at all. Also, unlike
disorderly conduct, possession of a pipe presents no imminent
danger to the public. There is simply no justification for vest-
ing unbridled discretion in police officers.'
Indiana's pipe possession statute is currently being challenged
on due process grounds," and should be held void-for-vagueness.
The statute violates due process in that it fails to provide even
minimal notice or enforcement guidelines. The dangers inherent
in such a vague statute can be illustrated by examining the man-
ner in which a pipe possession statute can be used to circum-
vent the probable cause requirement for drug searches. A pipe
law which fails to delineate ascertainable standards for enforce-
75. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 581-82 (1974) (flag abuse); Colten
v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (disorderly conduct); United States v.
Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947) (featherbedding).
76. Rose v. Locke, 96 S. Ct. 243, 244 (1975) ("sufficient warning");
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) ("fair warning"); United
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947) ("adequate warning").
77. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
78. Id. at 110.
79. Id. at 111.
80. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 581 (1974) (flag abuse pre-
sents no danger to the public).
81. Indiana Chapter, National Organization for the Reform of Mari-
juana Laws, Inc. (NORML) v. Sendak, Civil No. TH 75-142-C (S.D. Ind.,
filed July 18, 1975).
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ment effectively authorizes police conduct which violates the
fourth amendment.
Fourth Amendment Implications of Vague Pipe Possession Statutes
There have been few actual prosecutions for paraphernalia
possession;8" the real impact of a pipe possession statute is to
validate drug searches which would be patently unreasonable in
the absence of a pipe law. A paraphernalia statute, in effect, di-
lutes the fourth amendment standard that all searches be made
with probable cause." Mere possession of a pipe creates no more
than a suspicion of illegal drug activity. That suspicion will not
justify a drug search. When, however, the pipe itself is illegal,
a search may be made incident to a paraphernalia arrest. Thus,
the existence of a pipe possession statute becomes the determina-
tive factor in justifying drug searches.
The California pipe possession statute has frequently been
used to justify drug searches when probable cause for a search
would not exist in states without such a law.84 Two hypothetical
fact situations may be posed to illustrate the use of the statute
in the area of searches:
(a) A police officer sees a small metal pipe in plain
view in a vehicle. He proceeds to search the vehicle and
discovers hashish; or,
(b) During a reasonable pat-down frisk for weapons, a
police officer finds a corncob pipe in a suspect's pocket.
He searches the inside of the pipe which contains an un-
identifiable residue. A further search of the suspect dis-
closes marijuana on his person.
In each case, the possessor of the pipe will be charged with drug
possession. When the defendant moves to suppress evidence of
the drugs on the ground that the officer did not have probable
cause for the search, the existence of a pipe law becomes of para-
mount importance. In fact, whether he will be convicted for drug
82. Dacus v. State, 307 So. 2d 505 (Fla. App. 1975), is the only reported
prosecution under any of the five existing statutes. One case also arose under
a Texas pipe statute which has since been repealed. Pierron v. State, 475
S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
83. See notes 107-21 infra and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., People v. Nickles, 88 Cal. Rptr. 763, 9 Cal. App. 3d 986
(1970); People v. Superior Court for Santa Barbara County, 87 Cal. Rptr.
283, 8 Cal. App. 3d 398 (1970); Fraher v. Superior Court for County of
Los Angeles, 77 Cal. Rptr. 366, 272 Cal. App. 2d 155 (1969).
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possession depends almost entirely on whether the state has a
pipe possession law. 5
In those jurisdictions having no pipe law, the further searches
of the vehicle or suspect would be unreasonable, violating the
fourth amendment. Mere possession of a pipe does not present
such a strong inference of criminal purpose as to create probable
cause for a drug search."6 In one Pennsylvania case, where an
officer saw a small metal pipe in a car, the subsequent search of
the vehicle, which disclosed hashish, was held to violate the fourth
amendment." The Superior Court concluded that,
the officer's linking of the pipe with illicit activity could
not have been more than a suspicion, since such pipes can
be used to smoke tobacco or hashish or just for orna-
mentation. 8
Bare suspicion is no substitute for the probable cause required to
support a search under the fourth amendment.' Therefore, a
search based solely on possession of a pipe is unreasonable.
An examination of other cases from states where there is no
pipe law suggests that because marijuana and hashish parapher-
nalia are often used for innocent purposes, there is at best a sus-
picion of illegal use. In Ivins v. State,0 police officers conducted
a search after seeing a belt buckle which they decided resembled
a marijuana pipe. The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the
search was unreasonable, since the pipe could have been used for
tobacco or illegal drugs, or simply for ornamentation:
A pipe merely usable for marijuana smoking but for
other things as well, did not justify the further search
of [the suspect]. Merely placing a possible criminal con-
85. Compare Fraher v. Superior Court for County of Los Angeles, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 366, 272 Cal. App. 2d 155 (1969), with State v. Gannaway, 291 Minn.
391, 191 N.W.2d 555 (1971). Compare People v. Superior Court for Santa
Barbara County, 87 Cal. Rptr. 283, 8 Cal. App. 3d 398 (1970), with State v.
Parks, 5 Ore. App. 601, 485 P.2d 1246 (1971). and Commonwealth v. Phillips,
225 Pa. Super. 126, 310 A.2d 290 (1973).
86. See State v. Gannaway, 291 Minn. 391, 191 N.W.2d 555 (1971);
State v. Washington, 82 N.M. 284, 480 P.2d 174 (1971); State v. Parks, 5
Ore. App. 601, 485 P.2d 1246 (1971); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 225 Pa.
Super. 126, 310 A.2d 290 (1973).
87. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 225 Pa. Super. 126, 310 A.2d 290 (1973).
88. Id. at 127, 310 A.2d at 291 (emphasis added).
89. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) ; United States
v. Lewis, 504 F.2d 92, 101 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975).
90. 129 Ga. App. 865, 201 S.E.2d 683 (1973).
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struction on a thing or event which will support other
constructions is not a reliable tactic to justify personal
searches."
At best, a police officer's sight of a metal pipe, corncob pipe or
water pipe raises only a suspicion that the object is intended for
illegal drug use. A search based on that suspicion is unreasonable
under the fourth amendment.
In California, however, as in other jurisdictions which have
pipe laws,92 these further searches of the vehicle or suspect could
be upheld as incident to a paraphernalia arrest. The California
pipe statute prohibits possession of "an opium pipe or any device,
contrivance, instrument or paraphernalia" used for smoking con-
trolled drugs."' The police officer's expert testimony is used to
establish that a particular pipe is in fact contraband within the
scope of the statute.9 ' California courts have recognized that plain
sight of such an object does not create probable cause for a mari-
juana or hashish arrest."' At the same time, however, they have
held that plain sight of such an object gives the officer probable
cause for a paraphernalia arrest. Thus, the officer can arrest for
possession of paraphernalia and conduct the ensuing search as
incident to a lawful arrest.9 '
California courts have rested their decisions in pipe cases on
the power of the officer to arrest for pipe possession before the
drug search was made. These courts have not, however, carefully
considered whether there was probable cause for the underlying
paraphernalia arrest.9 ' When a pipe is discovered, the only cri-
terion for determining criminal purpose is the expert testimony
of the arresting officer. That testimony alone, without objective
standards for the defense attorney, judge or jury to evaluate it,
has been held sufficient to establish probable cause. '
91. Id. at 867, 201 S.E.2d at 685 (emphasis added).
92. Although the pipe possession statutes in Alabama, Florida, Indiana
and Mississippi have not yet been used to justify drug searches, the danger
for abuse remains as long as the vague statutes stand. See note 38 supra.
93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11364 (West 1975).
94. See note 84 supra.
95. People v. Fein, 94 Cal. Rptr. 607, 4 Cal. 3d 747, 484 P.2d 583 (1971);
People v. Ortiz, 80 Cal. Rptr. 469, 267 Cal. App. 2d 1 (1969).
96. See note 84 supra.
97. See Thomas v. Superior Court for County of San Joaquin, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 647, 22 Cal. App. 3d 972 (1972).
98. See note 84 supra.
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A warrantless search which is made incident to an arrest is
proper so long as it is limited in scope" and based on a lawful
arrest. The Supreme Court stated recently in United States v.
Robinson: °
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause
is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment;
that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the ar-
rest requires no additional justification. It is the fact
of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to
search. "
If the underlying arrest is itself unlawful or made without prob-
able cause, it cannot justify the incidental search."0 2 Moreover,
probable cause to arrest must exist before the search is made in
order for the search to be valid as incident to an arrest. 3
In states having pipe laws, a defendant arrested for pipe
possession and subsequently searched can attack the validity of
the search in two possible ways. First and most obviously, the
defendant can allege that there was no probable cause for the
paraphernalia arrest. As noted earlier,' 4 possession of a pipe
raises merely a suspicion of illegal purpose. The expert testi-
mony of the police officer does not change the basic nature of the
pipe itself; he had at best a suspicion that the pipe was intended
for drug use. That suspicion cannot be elevated to probable cause
without further evidence such as sight or smell of the drug itself.
However, if such additional evidence existed at the time of the
search, the police would not need to rely on a paraphernalia stat-
ute, since probable cause for a drug search could be established
independently.' 5
Similarly, the police may not use the drugs disclosed in an
incidental search to establish retroactively probable cause for the
underlying paraphernalia arrest."" But unless drugs are found in
99. The permissible scope of a warrantless search as incident to an
arrest was dramatically restricted in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969). A search is limited to the geographic area in which the arrestee
might be able to reach a weapon or destructible evidence. Id. at 763.
100. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
101. Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
102. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
103. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
104. See notes 86-91 supra and accompanying text.
105. See State v. Elliott, 10 Ore. App. 191, 499 P.2d 342 (1972).
106. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959); United States v.
McKim, 509 F.2d 769, 775 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the concomitant search, the suspicion that a pipe is contraband
cannot be raised to probable cause because of the innocent uses
of such objects. Although California courts have invoked the para-
phernalia statute to justify drug searches, the foregoing analysis
suggests that, without probable cause for a paraphernalia arrest,
the searches are still unreasonable.
Defendants might also challenge a drug search based on the
purported power of the police to make a paraphernalia arrest by
alleging that the paraphernalia statute itself is incompatible with
the fourth amendment. ' °7 In making the possession of a pipe a
crime, the legislature has indirectly authorized arrests based on
mere suspicion. As the Ninth Circuit noted recently in Powell
V. St&one,' °a
A legislature could not reduce the standard for arrest [or
for incidental search] from probable cause to suspicion
and it may not accomplish the same result by making
suspicious conduct a substantive offense. 9
Possession of a pipe is suspicious conduct, creating a suspicion
of illegal drug use. By making that conduct illegal, the legisla-
ture has subverted the probable cause requirement, authorizing
arrests and searches which are based solely on suspicion.
Pipe laws also negate the probable cause requirement because
of their unconstitutional vagueness. As noted above, the statutes
fail to provide any guidelines for those who enforce the law."
Each of the pipe laws is so vague that even a police officer acting
in good faith could not determine when the law was violated.
Discussing a vague vagrancy ordinance, the Powell court stated:
[The] language is so general and vague, the elements of
the offense so obscure, that they afford no reasonable
criteria by which an officer may determine whether the
ordinance has or has not been violated .... [A] n officer
107. Several recent federal circuit court decisions have held that va-
grancy ordinances which violate the fourth amendment cannot be used to
justify personal searches. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 44 U.S.L.W. 5313 (U.S. July 6, 1976) ; United States ex rel.
Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974); Hall v. United States,
459 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1972 (en bane), noted in 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 595 (1972)
and 18 VILL. L. REv. 117 (1972).
108. 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974).
109. Id. at 96.
110. See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
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cannot "gauge justification for . . . arrests consistently
with Fourth Amendment principles." '
Because the vagueness of pipe possession statutes gives rise to
"an inherent tendency to promote arrests based on mere sur-
mise""' that the statutes have been violated, they conflict with
the fourth amendment.
Once it is established that the pipe possession statutes vio-
late the fourth amendment, some justification must be found for
excluding the fruits of a search based on a paraphernalia arrest.
Even if the traditional function of the exclusionary rule is not
served, application of the rule will deter the legislature and main-
tain judicial integrity."' The exclusionary rule would not serve
to deter objectionable police conduct because the arresting officer
was relying in good faith on a presumably valid statute. An offi-
cer arresting for paraphernalia possession and searching incident
to that arrest should not be faulted for pursuing conduct author-
ized by a statute."" However, two functions would be served by
excluding the fruits of a paraphernalia-based search. First, legis-
lators would be deterred from enacting statutes violating the
fourth amendment. Unless the exclusionary rule is applied, the
legislature could re-enact vague pipe laws which, until challenged
in an actual paraphernalia prosecution, could be used to justify
unreasonable searches. Second, judicial integrity is maintained
by application of the exclusionary rule. In Terry v. Ohio,"5 the
Supreme Court stated:
Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will
not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitu-
tional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered gov-
ernmental use of the fruits of such invasions.'18
Thus, to deter the legislature and preserve judicial integrity, evi-
dence obtained in a drug search based on the police officer's reli-
ance on a paraphernalia statute should be excluded.
111. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 96-97 (9th Cir. 1974), quoting Hall
v. United States, 459 F.2d 831, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
112. Hall v. United States, 459 F.2d 831, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
113. See Comment, Evidence Obtained by Search After a Valid Arrest
Under a Vagrancy Statute Violative of the Fourth Amendment Probable
Cause Requirement is Inadmissible in a Subsequent Narcotics Prosecution,
47 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 595 (1972); Recent Developments, Fourth Amendment
Vagueness, 18 VILL. L. Rav. 117 (1972); Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 97-98
(9th Cir. 1974).
114. Id.
115. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
116. Id. at 12-13.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1976], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss2/6
1 PARAPHERNALIA STATUTES
In sum, current statutes prohibiting possession of parapher-
nalia for marijuana and hashish use are unconstitutionally vague
and violate the fourth amendment. Such statutes neither ade-
quately notify citizens of what items are contraband, nor do they
restrict police and prosecutors from selective enforcement. As
such, they deny due process of law. Furthermore, pipe possession
statutes enable police to make searches without the probable cause
contemplated by the fourth amendment. Due to the dangers posed
to freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, pipe possession stat-
utes cannot stand. As shall be shown, Indiana's statute prohibit-
ing sale and manufacture of drug paraphernalia suffers from the
same infirmities.
SALE OF PARAPHERNALIA-INDIANA'S SECTION 9
A recent amendment to Indiana's Controlled Substances Act"'7
marks a significant extension of legislation controlling drug para-
phernalia. In addition to prohibiting possession, the 1975 bill in-
cluded a new statute, Section 9, which prohibits manufacture or
sale of paraphernalia used with marijuana, hashish or cocaine. '
Section 9 is unique in that no other state restricts sale of such
paraphernalia." 9 Yet the provision's probable ineffectiveness as
a deterrent of drug use and its unreasonable interference with
many types of legitimate activity render it an unjustifiable exer-
cise of the state's power to protect the public health and wel-
fare. ° The defects inherent in attempting to prohibit sale of
pipes and other objects for marijuana and hashish use can be seen
from a comparison of Section 9 with other state statutes which
regulate the sale of hypodermic drug paraphernalia. Further-
more, Indiana's novel statute is unconstitutionally vague; it not
only invites, but is designed for, selective enforcement.
As a foundation for analysis of Section 9, its purposes and
problems, the statute must first be viewed in its entirety.
117. 1975 Ind. Acts, (Senate Bill 95) Public Law No. 338.
118. IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-9 (1975).
119. From 1969 to 1973, Florida prohibited sale of paraphernalia used
to smoke drugs. No cases arose under that section of the statute, which was
deleted when the Controlled Substances Act was adopted. Possession of smok-
ing paraphernalia is still illegal. Fla. Laws, 1969, c. 69-270, § 1, as amended
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(3) (a) (4) (Supp. 1975).
120. Indiana's drug paraphernalia statutes, both possession and sale,
are currently being challenged in federal court. A temporary restraining
order was issued at the time Section 9 was to go into effect, and a hearing
on the constitutionality of the statute is pending. NORML v. Sendak, Civil
No. TH 75-142-C (S.D. Ind., filed July 18, 1975).
1976]
et al.: Paraphernalia for Marijuana and Hashish Use: Possession Statutes
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1976
374 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
The Statute-Section 9
Indiana's new paraphernalia section prohibits unlawful deal-
ing in paraphernalia. One is guilty of unlawful dealing if he
"knowingly manufactures or delivers paraphernalia"' 2 ' or pos-
sesses it with the intent to manufacture or deliver.'22 "Delivery,"
which includes sale, is defined by the statute as "the actual, con-
structive, or attempted transfer" of paraphernalia.'"2 "Manufac-
turing," as defined by Section 9, encompasses a' wide range of
conduct, including,
production, preparation, construction, or processing of
paraphernalia, ... packaging or repackaging of the para-
phernalia, or the labeling or relabeling of it or its con-
tainer.'2 "
Thus, almost any handling of paraphernalia is forbidden.
In addition to defining what conduct is proscribed by the
law, Section 9 also attempts to define "paraphernalia." At the
beginning of the statute, the legislature resorted to the same gen-
eral terms which were used in the pipe possession statutes.'25
"Paraphernalia" is defined as,
any instrument, device, article, or contrivance used, de-
signed for use, or intended for use in ingesting, smoking,
administering, or preparing marijuana, hashish, hashish
oil, or cocaine.'26
Attempting to provide further specificity, the lawmakers listed
fourteen items which are to be considered "paraphernalia." The
list includes,
(i) metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or
ceramic marihuana or hashish pipes with or with-
out screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, or
punctured metal bowls;
(ii) water pipes designed for use or intended for use
with marihuana, hashish ...
(v) roach clips;
121. IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-9(a) (1) (1975).
122. IND. lCoDE § 35-24.1-4.1-9(a) (2) (1975).
123. IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-9(e) (1) (1975).
124. IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-9(e) (2) (1975).
125. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
126. IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-9(e) (3) (1975).
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(vi) separation gins designed for use or intended for
use in cleaning marihuana;
(vii) cocaine spoons and vials;
(viii) chamber pipes;
(x) electric pipes;
(xii) chilams;
(xiii) bongs; or,
(xiv) ice pipes or chillers.'2
The penalties for unlawful dealing in paraphernalia are not
trivial. In fact, if the Act is enforced,' 28 a pipe seller could be
penalized more than a seller of the drug used in the pipe. This
is particularly ironic since the Controlled Substances Act was
amended to lower marijuana penalties at the same time Section
9 was added. Under Section 9, a person convicted of selling a
roach clip is guilty of a felony and can receive a sentence of five
years and a thousand dollar fine.'"9 In stark contrast, a person
selling small amounts of marijuana or hashish commits only a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction can be sentenced to a maxi-
mum of one year imprisonment and receive a five hundred dollar
fine.'30 This disparity is particularly peculiar when one considers
that the purpose of the legislature in promulgating Section 9 was
to prevent the growth of illicit drug use.
Purpose and Unreasonableness of Section 9
Legislative history demonstrates that Section 9's prohibition
on manufacture and sale of marijuana and hashish paraphernalia
was designed to prevent use of these drugs. However, unlike older
narcotics paraphernalia statutes in other states, the criminaliza-
tion of paraphernalia manufacture and sale does not rationally
serve to deter drug abuse. As such, Section 9 violates the due
process requirement that a statute reasonably further the legiti-
mate ends it seeks to promote.
Comments from Indiana legislators who were instrumental
in passing Section 9 indicate that it was enacted to prevent drug
127. IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-9(C) (3) (i-xiv) (1975).
128. See note 120 supra.
129. IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-9(b) (1975).
130. These are first offense penalties. IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-10(b)
(1975).
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use. One state senator described the motivation behind passage
of the bill:
The paraphernalia section was added . . . because the
majority of the senators were persuaded that the sales
of so-called paraphernalia was increasing marijuana and
hashish sales. According to the proponents of the amend-
ment young people were being introduced into the drug
subculture with the purchase of [a] fancy roach clip or
hashish pipe. The sponsors of the bill were convinced
that the attractive and novel paraphernalia was a sig-
nificant stimulus to use illegal drugs.'
The author and sponsor of Section 9 also emphasized that it was
intended to prevent drug use:
If possession of certain substances is to be illegal, we
ought not contradict ourselves by saying its [sic] all
right to market items to injest [sic] these illegal sub-
stances. The marketing of paraphernalia tends to glorify
the use of drugs and likewise tends to lure more young
people into using these drugs."3 2
Thus, the legislators passed Section 9, prohibiting manufacture
or sale of paraphernalia, in order to deglamorize the use of drugs
and thereby prevent the growth of drug abuse.
The power of the states to prevent and control drug abuse
has been recognized as within the states' police power to promote
public health and safety.'33 In exercising their authority to com-
bat drug abuse, however, states are bound by due process stan-
dards imposed by the federal constitution.'3 " Due process requires
that the means chosen to exercise the police power must be rea-
sonably adapted to effectuate some permissible purpose.' 5 Thus,
the Indiana paraphernalia statute must be reasonably adapted to
131. Letter from Leslie Duvall to M. Gienapp, Sept. 18, 1975, on file
Valparaiso University Law School Library.
132. Letter from Charles E. Bosma to M. Gienapp, Oct. 1975, on file
Valparaiso University Law School Library.
133. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962); Whipple v.
Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).
134. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957); State v. Garland,
99 N.J. Super. 383, 240 A.2d 41 (1968).
135. People v. Aguiar, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597 (1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 970 (1968); State v. Rush, - Me. -, 324 A.2d
748 (1974).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1976], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss2/6
PARAPHERNALIA STATUTES
prevent drug use; it must not be unreasonable or arbitrary, nor
can it unduly interfere with individual freedoms.
Section 9, however, is neither an effective nor a reasonable
means of preventing drug use. Because of the ready availability
of common substitutes for expressly outlawed paraphernalia, en-
forcement of the law would have little, if any, effect in reducing
drug use. In addition, due to the wide variety of activity swept
into the statute's scope, it unreasonably interferes with conduct
having no connection with drug use. Accordingly, Section 9 is
not a justifiable exercise of the state's police power. The ineffec-
tiveness and unreasonableness of Section 9 may be illustrated by
comparing it to older and more numerous laws regulating the
sale of other types of drug paraphernalia.
Two types of drug paraphernalia sale statutes have been en-
acted in other states. First, many states control the sale of hypo-
dermic needles which are indispensible for heroin injection."'
Heroin addicts require some type of hypodermic needle in order
to inject the drug.'"" Sale or manufacture of needles is not totally
prohibited, however, because of the legitimate medical uses for
the instruments. Rather, legal sale of hypodermic instruments is
limited to those with a valid prescription or persons in special
professions. 3 ' Only the slight inconvenience of obtaining a pre-
scription is imposed on legitimate needle users." 9
In addition to regulating sale of hypodermic instruments, a
few states also regulate the sale of another type of heroin para-
phernalia-articles needed by drug traffickers to prepare and
package heroin for sale."' ° These trafficking paraphernalia stat-
utes restrict the sale of common heroin dilutents necessary for
"cutting," i.e., mixing or diluting the potent drug, as well as con-
tainers such as empty capsules or envelopes used to package heroin
in individual doses. 4 ' Like hypodermic instruments, heroin di-
136. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4140 (West 1974); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 22-54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975).
137. Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Crime, Crime in Amer-
ica, Heroin Importation, Distribution, Packaging and Paraphernalia, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., at 81 (1970).
138. See note 136 supra.
139. Dyton v. State, - Del. - , 250 A.2d 383 (1969).
140. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 287-88 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 220.50 (McKinney Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.109:1 (1974).
141. For a more extensive discussion of heroin trafficking parapherna-
lia, see, Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Crime, Crime in Amer-
ica-The Heroin Paraphernalia Trade, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), and
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lutants and containers can be used for many beneficial and inno-
cent purposes. ' To protect these innocent uses, the statutes do
not forbid all sales. Rather, some statutes require that each sale
be recorded,' 3 others limit sales to small amount of dilutants or
capsules which are insufficient for heroin trafficking purposes.'
In comparison to these hypodermic and trafficking parapher-
nalia statutes, Indiana's Section 9 is ineffective in preventing drug
abuse. No special devices are necessary to use marijuana, hashish
or cocaine. Unlike the heroin addict who needs a hypodermic
needle for injections, a marijuana smoker does not require a spe-
cially designed pipe, or any of the paraphernalia listed in the
statute. Cocaine users do not need a "cocaine spoon" forbidden
under Section 9; any kitchen spoon or piece of tinfoil can be used
to hold the drug. Therefore, even if the statute were enforced, it
would have at most a minimal effect on drug use. However, the
ineffectiveness of Section 9 in implementing its purpose does not
alone make it an unreasonable exercise of the police power.'43
The unreasonableness of the statute grows out of a second dif-
ference between it and the other types of sale statutes.
Unlike the other paraphernalia sale statutes, Section 9 un-
duly interferes with conduct which presents no danger to the
public. The statute does not recognize or provide for legitimate
uses of the items listed as "paraphernalia." No "water pipes de-
signed for" drug use can be sold under the statute, although those
identical pipes are frequently used only for ornamentation. "Sep-
aration gins designed for" preparing marijuana cannot be sold,
although those same separators are normally used by tea and spice
makers for cleaning herbs. "Roach clips," another prohibited item,
are nothing more than small clamps, commonly used for construct-
ing electrical equipment. The statute makes no allowance for these
legitimate uses, but puts a blanket prohibition on the sale or manu-
facture of these devices. That prohibition is an unreasonable inter-
ference with conduct having no rational connection with drug use.
In drafting Section 9, the legislature did not limit the statute
to objects necessarily connected with drug use. Because of the
Christianson, Heroin Paraphernalia: Breakdown of a Fix, 10 CRIM. L. BULL.
493 (1974).
142. See notes 137 and 141 supra.
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.109:3 (1974).
144. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 287-88 (Supp. 1973).
145. "A statute is not invalid under the Constitution .. .because it may
not succeed in bringing about the result that it tends to produce." Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 50 (1966).
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indefinite language of the statute, Section 9 unreasonably inter-
feres with innocent conduct and goes beyond the permissible scope
of the state's police power. Accordingly, Section 9 violates due
process because it is arbitrary and irrational. In addition, the
broad language of the statute runs afoul of due process standards
for definiteness.
Section 9-Due Process Definiteness
Since the Indiana paraphernalia sale statute creates a new
criminal offense without any common law history, it is particu-
larly susceptible to a void-for-vagueness challenge. New criminal
statutes must be carefully scrutinized for definiteness because they
now forbid conduct which was previously considered to be accept-
able legal behavior.' Under due process, a criminal statute must
provide both notice and-enforcement guidelines." 7 To ensure that
people are not trapped by their heretofore innocent conduct, the
statute making that conduct illegal must provide adequate notice
to those who might be subject to its penalties. In addition, the
new statute must set forth enforcement guidelines so that law en-
forcement officials, judges and juries can know what conduct is
forbidden and how to apply the new statute. Section 9 meets
neither criteria, at least as to most paraphernalia. Moreover, its
vagueness invites selective enforcement against shops catering
to youths.
Section 9 violates the first test of definiteness because it does
not provide fair notice of what items may not be sold. This notice
test of definiteness is particularly important because, unlike the
pipe possession statutes examined earlier, Section 9 regulates com-
mercial behavior which can be planned out in advance." '8 The
minimal notice required of a drug paraphernalia statute was con-
sidered in Cole v. State."" The Oklahoma law made it illegal to
possess "any paraphernalia" used by drug abusers. The statute
was held unconstitutionally vague because a person would not
know what "paraphernalia" meant, and could not determine what
146. For discussions of the impact of vagueness in new penal statutes,
see United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 634 (1954) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing) ; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1948); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Ruv. 67 (1960).
147. See text at notes 52-65 supra.
148. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).
149. 511 P.2d 593 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
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objects were forbidden."' Indiana's Section 9 also uses the in-
definite term "paraphernalia ;" unlike the Oklahoma statute, how-
ever, Section 9 includes a definition of the term.
The Indiana legislature's attempt to further define "para-
phernalia" does not save Section 9 from vagueness. Merchants
are warned that they may not sell any objects "used, designed for
use, or intended for use" with specified drugs. Yet merchants
must still speculate as to whether "intended for use" means that
the manufacturer intended the object to be used for drugs, or
that the buyer intends drug use. No guidelines are set out for
deciding what devices are "designed for use" with drugs. Even
the enumerated list of types of paraphernalia in Section 9 does
not give merchants and manufacturers fair warning. For exam-
ple, the first inclusion is "metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone,
plastic, or ceramic marihuana or hashish pipes."'"' This provision
gives no indication of what makes a pipe a "marihuana or hashish
pipe" rather than a tobacco pipe. The statute also prohibits sale
of water pipes which are "designed for use or intended for use"
with controlled drugs.'52 Because the statute does not state what
differentiates an ornamental water pipe from one designed for
drug use, manufacturers and retailers are not given adequate
notice of what conduct would subject them to criminal prosecu-
tion under Section 9. They would have to forego dealing in any
pipes at all in order to avoid violating Section 9.
In drafting Section 9, the legislature considered the difficul-
ties in defining "paraphernalia." Attempting to differentiate be-
tween legal and illegal pipes, the legislators determined that there
was a structural difference:
Proponents of the amendment argued that there is a vast
difference between tobacco pipes and hashish or mari-
juana pipes which require totally different structure.
Proponents argued that whereas tobacco pipes try to re-
duce the amount of condensation of tars and other by-
products, marijuana pipes capitalize on the condensation
of the smoke to augment the effect of the drug.' 3
If, in fact, such a structural difference in pipes exists, the legis-
lature did not reflect the difference on the face of the statute.
150. Id. at 595.
151. IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-9(c) (3) (i) (1975).
152. IND. CODE § 35-24.1-4.1-9(c) (3) (ii) (1975).
153. Letter from Leslie Duvall to M. Gienapp, Sept. 18, 1975, on file
Valparaiso University Law School Library.
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As written, the statute provides no standard by which any pipe
seller could determine whether a particular pipe is "designed for"
marijuana rather than tobacco use.
For some items listed in Section 9, adequate notice may be
provided. Where terms used in a statute have special significance
within the group to which the law applies, the group is deemed
to have notice based on that special meaning."" Some terms used
in Section 9 are absolutely meaningless to the general public and
do not even have dictionary meanings: chamber pipes, chilams,
bongs, ice pipes. However, these words are frequently used in the
pipe business, and refer to special pipes and smoking devices. 5'
Merchants and manufacturers could reasonably be charged with
notice as to these items because of the meaning in the trade. As
to the majority of items listed, however, no notice is provided.
Because notice, an essential element in definiteness, is lacking,
Section 9 violates due process.
Section 9 also fails to satisfy the second test of due process
definiteness which requires guidelines for those who enforce and
apply the law. If pipe makers and sellers cannot determine what
pipes are "designed for" drug use, neither can a policeman or
jury. Although "expert testimony" by narcotics officers could be
used to establish that an item sold was within the definition of
paraphernalia," 6 there would be no way to challenge the testi-
mony. The effect of the statute's failure to limit law enforcement
is not, as in the case of the pipe possession statutes, to expand the
opportunity for unreasonable searches. Rather, Section 9 invites
selective enforcement because it does not limit the power of the
law enforcer.
Section 9 permits the arrest of any pipe seller in Indiana,
without any objective standard by which a judge or jury could
determine guilt or innocence. Inviting selective enforcement,
Section 9 would most likely not be applied against tobacconists
or novelty gift shops. The police probably would concentrate
on proprietors of "head shops," which are small businesses, sell-
ing records, posters, pipes and other novelty items, catering to
young people's tastes. Sale of the same pipes by different pro-
prietors could be ignored.
154. Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925);
United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1973).
155. See note 50 supra.
156. See note 84 supra.
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Comments by Indiana legislators reinforce the conclusion that
Section 9 was primarily enacted for selective enforcement against
head shops. The author of the statute stated:
The bill was prompted by the fact that "head shops" were
able to circumvent existing laws prohibiting the offering
for sale of paraphernalia.""
In fact, there were no "existing laws ;" the paraphernalia business
of head shops and other stores was not prohibited until the enact-
ment of Section 9. Another state senator stated that,
It seemed inconsistent and unreasonable to outlaw mari-
juana and other drugs but overlook the pot shops that
were in existence. 58
The "pot shops" referred to by the learned senator were appar-
ently head shops, not illegally selling "pot," but legally selling
records, posters and pipes. The plaintiff head shop owners in the
suit challenging Section 9 have alleged that they had been warned
by state officials that their shops would be closed when the bill
took effect. 5 In fact, numerous shops throughout the state closed
when Section 9 was passed and signed into law.
Because the section has never been enforced, it is not possible
to state whether discriminatory enforcement would actually re-
sult. The vagueness of the statute, though, invites discriminatory
enforcement. Because no pipe seller could, acting in good faith,
avoid selling the forbidden items, and because the statute forbids
every pipe currently sold, Section 9 must necessarily be enforced
only against those whom policemen and prosecutors, without ob-
jective criterion, choose to harass. Due process forbids such a
law. Section 9 is ineffective, unreasonable, and impermissibly
vague; Indiana's "pipe dream" should be held unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The recent flurry of legislative activity to curb illicit drug
use in this country has led to the enactment of several statutory
measures which are of questionable constitutional validity. Pipe
possession laws, which outlaw paraphernalia for marijuana and
157. Letter from Charles E. Bosma to M. Gienapp, Oct. 1975, on file
Valparaiso University Law School Library.
158. Letter from Wilfrid J. Ullrich to M. Gienapp, Nov. 1, 1975, (em-
phasis added), on file Valparaiso University Law School Library.
159. Complaint at 5, NORML v. Sendak, Civil No. TH 75-142-C (S.D.
Ind., filed July 18, 1975).
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hashish use, are unreasonably and unconstitutionally vague. Be-
cause these statutes neither notify citizens of what items are con-
traband nor provide any adjudicative guidelines for police, prose-
cutors or juries, such statutes violate fundamental notions of due
process. In addition, pipe possession statutes artificially create
probable cause of illegal drug possession, thereby authorizing
police to arrest and make incidental searches of suspected drug
users that could not otherwise be lawfully made. As such, these
statutes dilute the substance of the probable cause requirement
and violate the essence of the fourth amendment.
Indiana's unique and unprecedented attempt to prohibit the
manufacture and sale of paraphernalia used with marijuana,
hashish or cocaine suffers from similar constitutional infirmi-
ties. Because of the wide variety of activities which are swept
into the scope of Section 9, it unreasonably interferes with con-
duct having no connection with drug use. Even in regulating drug
use, Section 9 is an ineffective deterrent because there exist other
readily available substitutes for expressly outlawed paraphernalia.
Accordingly, this provision is an arbitrary and unjustifiable ex-
ercise of the state's power to control drugs. Furthermore, like
the pipe possession laws, Section 9 is unconstitutionally vague in
that it invites selective and discriminatory enforcement, since it
provides neither adequate notice to paraphernalia users nor adju-
dicative guidelines for law enforcers.
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